

**REMARKS**

Claims 1-20 are currently pending in the present application and are presently under consideration. Claims 1-3, 6, 10, 12, and 15-17 have been amended herein. FIG. 2 has been amended to correctly illustrate a location of a ROM section (reference numeral 40). A request for approval of drawing changes has been sent via U.S. mail concurrently with this reply. All pending claims with status identifiers are at pages 2-4.

Favorable reconsideration is requested in view of the comments below.

**I. Rejection of Claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. §112**

Claim 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. The herein amendments to claim 17 are believed to cure any perceived indefiniteness in the rejected claim. Accordingly, withdrawal of this rejection is respectfully requested.

**II. Rejection of Claims 1-5, 7-8, 10, 12-14, and 17-19 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e)**

Claims 1-5, 7-8, 10, 12-14, and 17-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by McNabb, *et al.* (U.S. 6,289,462). Reconsideration and allowance of claims 1-5, 7-8, 10, 12-14, and 17-19 is respectfully requested for at least the following reasons. McNabb, *et al.* does not disclose, teach, or suggest each and every feature of applicants' invention as recited in the subject claims.

"A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ 2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). "The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the...claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

More particularly, McNabb, *et al.* does not disclose *applying a trust level to a first module*, wherein *the first module requests access to a distributed computing platform* as recited independent claims 1, 10, and 12. Distributed computing enables a

process to run a single computational task on more than one distinct computer – thus, a distributed computing platform is a system that facilitates distributed computing. Creating applications for a distributed platform is facilitated *via* exposing internals of the distributed platform to the programming community. The present invention as recited in these claims provides for a system and/or methodology for determining a degree of trust relating to an application that desires access to the distributed platform. The subject invention thereby enables a developer of a distributed computing platform to confidently allow applications desiring access to perform particular tasks according to a level of trust that is assigned. For example, an application designed by an independent programmer that desires to utilize the distributed computing platform (to enable distributed computing with respect to the application) can request access to internals of the distributed computing platform. Thereafter, if the application is fully trusted, such application can be provided with read and write privileges within the distributed platform. If the application is not trusted, then it can be denied access to the distributed platform entirely. Furthermore, in an instance that the application can be partially trusted, it can be given “read-only” rights to data related to the distributed platform.

In contrast, McNabb, *et al.* teaches a system and/or methodology that facilitates improved security in connection with a server that facilitates Internet communications. For example, McNabb, *et al.* provides different security systems that disallow a person logged onto a network as an “administrator” from exploiting bugs in programs to which that person should not have access. These security mechanisms provide for creation of a *trusted server*. McNabb, *et al.*, however, does not teach or suggest employing security mechanisms in connection with a *distributed computing platform* as recited in the subject claims. Furthermore, McNabb, *et al.* does not teach or suggest *applying a trust level to... a module requesting access to the distributed computing platform*. The extended attributes cited by the Examiner are assigned to each file and process *prior* to receiving a request for access to such files. “File permissions are modified such that extended attributes are assigned to each file and executable process where these attributes are subsequently examined whenever a request is received by the system.” (See col. 4, ln. 54-58). McNabb, *et al.* further discloses assigning sensitivity levels that are employed in connection with directing a process and/or data to a particular portion of

memory. These sensitivity levels, however, are not employed in connection with *determining a level of access to a distributed computing platform.*

As McNabb, *et al.*, does not disclose, teach, or suggest employing security measures in connection with a *distributed computing platform*, McNabb, *et al.* cannot anticipate the subject invention as recited in the subject claims. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1, 10, and 12 (and claims 2-5, 7-8, 12-14, and 17-19, which respectively depend therefrom) should be withdrawn.

### **III. Rejection of Claims 6, 9, 11, 15-16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)**

Claims 6, 9, 11, 15-16, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over McNabb, *et al.* in view of McManis (U.S. 6,546,487). Reconsideration and allowance of claims 6, 9, 11, 15-16, and 20 is respectfully requested for at least the following reasons. Neither McNabb, *et al.*, nor McManis, individually or in combination, teach or suggest all the claim limitations of the subject invention.

To reject claims in an application under §103, an examiner must establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness. A *prima facie* case of obviousness is established by a showing of three basic criteria. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) ***must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.*** See MPEP §706.02(j) (emphasis added).

McManis teaches a program module verifier that receives a procedural call from a first program module, wherein the first program module includes a procedural call to a second program module. The procedural call to the program module verifier is executed prior to the procedural call to the second program module. The program module verifier then determines whether to allow the first program module to complete the procedural call to the second program module. However, like McNabb, McManis does not teach or suggest employing any security mechanisms in connection with a *distributed computing platform*. Furthermore, McManis does not disclose applying a trust level to a program

module – rather, the second program module is either allowed to execute or not allowed to execute. Therefore, McManis does not make up for the aforementioned deficiencies of McNabb, *et al.* with respect to independent claims 1, 10, and 12.

In view of the foregoing, it is readily apparent that this rejection should be withdrawn.

**IV. Conclusion**

The present application is believed to be condition for allowance in view of the above comments and amendments. A prompt action to such end is earnestly solicited.

In the event any fees are due in connection with this document, the Commissioner is authorized to charge those fees to Deposit Account No. 50-1063.

Should the Examiner believe a telephone interview would be helpful to expedite favorable prosecution, the Examiner is invited to contact applicants' undersigned representative at the telephone number listed below.


Respectfully submitted,

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**Fig. 2**